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VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION
AND COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Robert C. Post*
Martin Redish's argument, if I grasp it correctly, is that the
failure to extend "full First Amendment protection"' to commercial
speech essentially amounts to "a form of impermissible viewpoint
discrimination undermining of the very core of what the First
Amendment is all about."2 So far as Redish is concerned, viewpoint
discrimination is rightly regarded as "the most universally
condemned threat to the foundations of free expression"' because the
prohibition of viewpoint discrimination prevents the regulation of
expression from degenerating into "a struggle for political power."4
"There can be no exceptions to the constitutional bar of viewpoint-
based regulations," Redish writes, "because to permit one exception
is effectively to permit all viewpoint-based regulations."5
I must confess that despite my great admiration for Martin
Redish I am in complete disagreement with this argument. There is
much I could say about our differences, but in this brief comment I
shall confine myself to two points: First, the concept of "viewpoint
discrimination" is too confused and uncertain to carry the weight that
Redish imposes on it. Second, even if an intelligible meaning could
be given to the idea of viewpoint discrimination, there are good, non-
viewpoint-based reasons for extending to commercial speech forms
of protection that differ from those extended to political speech.
* David Boies Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. Martin H. Redish, Commercial Speech, First Amendment Intuitionism and the Twilight
Zone of Viewpoint Discrimination, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 67, 68 (2007).
2. Id. at 108.
3. Id. at 69.
4. Id. at 107.
5. Id. at 109-10.
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I. THE MEANING OF VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION
A commonsense understanding of the prohibition against
viewpoint discrimination is that government should be prevented
from intervening into an ongoing political controversy by silencing
one side to the dispute. I would have thought, therefore, that
Scenario 1 would represent a paradigmatic example of viewpoint
discrimination:
Scenario 1: A socialist who is running for President of the
United States condemns the war in Iraq and urges citizens
not to volunteer for the military. As a result, military
recruitment drops precipitously. The government
prosecutes the candidate on the basis of a statute that
prohibits interference with the conduct of an ongoing war.6
Redish, however, seems to question whether Scenario 1 is
properly an example of viewpoint discrimination. He writes that
"the concept of viewpoint discrimination as employed in First
Amendment analysis ... is confined to governmental penalizations
of expression for no reason other than disagreement with or disdain
for the normative views expressed."' Redish seems to think that
viewpoint discrimination is exclusively about the reason or
motivation for government intervention; it is not about what the
government actually does. Because in Scenario 1 the government
does not penalize the speech of the candidate "for no reason other
than disagreement with or disdain"' for the candidate's views, but
instead for the reason that the candidate is in fact interfering with the
prosecution of a war, Scenario 1 does not meet Redish's definition of
viewpoint discrimination.
Although the definition offered by Redish is similar to that
proffered in some Supreme Court opinions, it is untenable. The
definition is so narrow and restricted that it would drain the concept
of viewpoint discrimination of all practical value. Defined as Redish
would define it, the concept of viewpoint discrimination would not
even reach core cases like Scenario 1, much less accomplish the far-
reaching work that Redish seeks to attribute to it in the present
article.
6. See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211,212 (1919).
7. Redish, supra note 1, at 110 n. 121.
8. Id.
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Redish knows this, which is why in his article he attempts to
load the concept of viewpoint discrimination with meanings that are
quite distinct from his definition. He argues, for example, that the
distinction between "'harms' that flow from illegal ... behavior, on
the one hand, and harms that flow from ...lawful behavior"9 is
relevant to the presence of viewpoint discrimination. But this
distinction has nothing whatever to do with Redish's definition,
which renders the nature of the harm regulated by the government
irrelevant to existence vel non of viewpoint discrimination. Redish's
definition identifies a regulation as viewpoint neutral so long as the
government enacts it to avert harm rather than "for no reason other
than disagreement with or disdain for the normative views
expressed."'" It is also mystifying why Redish classifies government
regulations that suppress "speech... because of who the speaker is"
as a "form of indirect viewpoint discrimination."" So long as
different speakers can cause different harms, and so long as
government attempts to prevent the harm caused by different
speakers, such regulations would not seem to meet Redish's
definition.
One is led to ask why Redish might propose such a uselessly
narrow definition of viewpoint discrimination. I think it is because
he is concerned about a case like Scenario 2:
Scenario 2: X is one of a small minority of dentists who
strongly believes that mercury amalgam fillings harm
patients. X recommends that his patients replace their
mercury amalgam fillings with gold or composition fillings.
The official state dental association, which believes that
mercury amalgam fillings are safe, threatens X with the loss
of his license if he continues to give this advice to his
patients. The association believes that replacing mercury
amalgam fillings is professionally irresponsible because it
will subject patients to considerable risk for no
scientifically measurable benefit.'
2
9. Id. at 115.
10. Id.atlOn.121.
11. Id. at 117.
12. This scenario is based upon real cases that are discussed in Robert Post, Informed
Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 ILL. L.
REv. 939, 947-50.
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In Scenario 2 as in Scenario 1, the government suppresses one side
of a public debate in order to avert harm.
Scenario 2, however, poses an awkward dilemma for Redish.
Scenario 2 describes a form of legal regulation that is certainly
constitutional and that happens every day throughout the United
States. There are many forms of regulation that are analogous to
Scenario 2. Consider the regulation of legal malpractice, which
penalizes lawyers' opinions which are said not to meet
"professional" standards. Consider prison administrators that permit
inmates to invite outside speakers who oppose drug use but not
speakers who advocate drug use. Consider what would happen if
President Bush were to fire Secretary of State Rice because she
stated in public that the Iraq war was a mistake. 3
My guess is that Redish is unwilling to acknowledge that the
regulation at issue in Scenario 2 constitutes viewpoint discrimination
because that would imply that viewpoint discrimination happens
routinely and constitutionally throughout the United States, and
Redish wishes to maintain that viewpoint discrimination is
universally condemned and everywhere unconstitutional. He thus
offers instead an impossibly narrow and useless definition of
viewpoint discrimination that would exclude even Scenario 1 and
that is so limited that he refuses to abide by it even in his own article.
Redish is actually quite uncertain about the meaning of
viewpoint discrimination, and in the course of his article he offers
many different descriptions. The account I find most attractive is the
one he develops in the section of his paper entitled "The Essential
Characteristic of Viewpoint Discrimination." 4 Redish does not in
this section define viewpoint discrimination in terms of
"disagreement" or "disdain." He instead considers regulations that
impose what he calls "First Amendment selectivity" 5-by which I
think he means regulations that suppress one side to a dispute-and
13. Redish seeks to distinguish this example because it involves "government subsidies and
benefits," Redish, supra note 1, at 109-10 n.120, rather than "coercive regulations and
prohibitions." Id. at 109. But the attempted distinction does not hold. Firing Rice is quite
distinct from denying her a subsidy or a benefit. Consider, for example, what would happen if the
State of California were to fire a Berkeley professor because she spoke out against the war.
14. Id. at 113-14.
15. Id. at 113.
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he asks whether such regulations do so for reasons "that are
'internal' to the First Amendment."' 6 Redish explains that
Viewpoint discrimination . . . is grounded in
considerations that are "external" to the First Amendment.
By this assertion, I mean that the driving normative force
has nothing to do with a good faith effort to determine the
process or structural values of free expression. Rather, it
flows from normative premises determined by entirely
unrelated factors of political, social, economic, moral, or
religious belief or concerns that are wholly external to the
First Amendment itself."
This account of viewpoint discrimination seems to me quite
plausible. It suggests that the root idea of viewpoint discrimination
is not whether the state suppresses views with which it disagrees, but
instead whether selective state interventions can be justified by
considerations that are "internal" to the First Amendment. I interpret
this to mean that the question raised by viewpoint discrimination is
whether selective government regulations are justifiable under the
First Amendment.
This way of looking at the problem would explain why Scenario
1 seems to be an example of viewpoint discrimination. In Scenario
1, the government is attempting to avert harm by selectively
intervening in public discussion to prevent speech from being
persuasive. Because persuasion is a property of public debate that
the First Amendment is especially concerned to protect, the
intervention in Scenario 1 cannot be justified by considerations
internal to the First Amendment. Although in Scenario 2 the
government also selectively intervenes to avert harm that may be
caused by persuasion, communications between dentists and patients
are not only outside of public debate, they occur in a context in
which the First Amendment permits society to prize truth and
competence above persuasiveness. 8 The intervention in Scenario 2
is thus not considered viewpoint discrimination.
This way of conceptualizing the problem of viewpoint
discrimination is both flexible and subtle. But it implies that whether
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. For a discussion, see Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2353 (2000).
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a particular regulation is viewpoint-based depends largely upon one's
theory of the First Amendment. To condemn a "selective" regulation
as viewpoint discriminatory is another way of saying that the
regulation makes distinctions that are "external" to a proper
understanding of the First Amendment. The hard analytic work must
therefore be done by theorizing the First Amendment. The
fundamental question will always be whether a correct interpretation
of the First Amendment permits or condemns particular selective
interventions. The label "viewpoint discrimination" seems to be
nothing more than a term of opprobrium that encapsulates
conclusions reached by independent First Amendment jurisprudence.
If I am correct in this line of analysis, Redish's extended
discussion of viev;,point discrimination does not add much to his
fundamental point, which is that the First Amendment should be
interpreted to extend full protection to commercial speech. It is to
this more fundamental point that I shall now briefly turn.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Redish begins his argument with a certain picture of how the
First Amendment works. His premise seems to be that speech is
entitled to "full First Amendment protection"' 9 unless "principled
analysis"" can justify exceptional treatment.
I have argued elsewhere that this picture of the First Amendment
is fundamentally misguided.2 The problem with Redish's picture
becomes apparent if we ask how we can know whether any particular
form of communication should qualify as speech for purposes of the
First Amendment. We might ask, for example, whether video games
are protected speech. What about scientific research? Or computer
source code? These questions cannot be answered by reference to
the text of the First Amendment or to the original intent of the
Framers. They can be answered only by specifying the values which
the First Amendment serves and by determining whether the
particular forms of communication at issue advance these values.
If I am right to conclude that First Amendment inquiry must
proceed in this manner, Redish's underlying picture of the First
19. Redish, supra note 1, at 68.
20. Id. at 76.
21. Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1249 (1995).
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Amendment cannot be correct. The questions I have identified imply
that the First Amendment does not protect "speech as such,"2 but
only speech that serves relevant First Amendment values. The
function of First Amendment protection is to ensure that speech can
continue to serve these values. Because different forms of speech
will serve these values in different ways, constitutional protection
will extend differently to different forms of speech. It therefore
makes little sense to speak of speech as being "fully" protected; what
matters is that speech receive the forms of protection necessary to
guarantee that it will continue to serve relevant First Amendment
values.
Redish believes, and I agree, that "the First Amendment is a
logical outgrowth" of "the democratic process." 3 We may thus ask
how commercial speech serves the constitutional value of
democracy. This question can be answered only if we have in hand a
theory of constitutional democracy. Redish asserts that because
democracy is ultimately about "self-development and self-
determination," "private self-government" is a fundamental goal of
constitutional democracy. 4  His basic point is that commercial
speech serves this goal and as a consequence should receive the same
constitutional protection as public discourse.
I disagree with Redish's premise. In my view, democracy is not
about individual self-government, but about collective self-
determination. Collective self-determination both requires25 and is
distinct from individual autonomy.26  Democracy is a way of
constructing government so that citizens can enjoy the political
goods of living together and the fruits of social cooperation. It is a
mistake to conflate democracy with libertarianism. Democracy may
require that individual autonomy be limited so that a collective will
22. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 478 (1997) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
23. Redish, supra note 1, at 111.
24. Id. at 81.
25. See Robert Post, Equality and Autonomy in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 95 MICH.
L. REV. 1517 (1997); Robert Post, Democracy and Equality, 603 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF
POL. AND SOC. SCIENCE 24 (2006) [hereinafter Post, Democracy and Equality].
26. See Robert Post, Between Democracy and Community: The Legal Constitution of Social
Form, in DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY: NOMOS XXXV, at 163 (John W. Chapman & Ian Shapiro
eds., 1993).
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can be forged and implemented,27 and it may require that individual
autonomy be limited so that the common values that underwrite the
enterprise of collective self-determination can be maintained.28 Most
importantly, democracy requires individual autonomy only to the
extent that citizens seek to forge "a common will, communicatively
shaped and discursively clarified in the political public sphere."29
Unlike various forms of liberalism, democracy does not focus on the
protection of individual autonomy outside of participation within this
public sphere."
What Redish calls "full First Amendment protection"'" is the
constitutional standard by which the First Amendment determines
the constitutionality of restrictions on speech that is deemed
necessary to forge a common, democratic will. Elsewhere I have
used the term "public discourse"32 to designate this kind of speech.
Within public discourse, the First Amendment protects speakers'
rights so that speakers can participate as they deem necessary in the
formation of public opinion. This protection follows from the
premise that the purpose of the First Amendment is to protect
processes of democratic legitimation, and from the claim that
autonomy of participation in public discourse is necessary for
democratic legitimation.33 Speech outside of public discourse, by
contrast, does not merit these protections, because autonomy of
speech in such contexts is not necessary to ensure the democratic
legitimation safeguarded by the First Amendment. Ultimately this is
what distinguishes Scenario 1 from Scenario 2. For a citizen to
oppose a war in public discourse is to participate in the process of
democratic self-determination; for a dentist to recommend dental
treatment to a patient is not.
27. This is what would justify President Bush's firing of Secretary of State Rice if she were
to speak in a manner inconsistent with the achievement of administration policies. For a full
explanation, see Robert Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of
the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713 (1987).
28. These complicated questions are discussed in ROBERT POST, CONSTITUTIONAL
DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT (1995).
29. 2 JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 81 (Thomas
McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1987) (1981).
30. Various forms of individual autonomy may be required, however, in order to assure the
possibility of participation within the public sphere.
31. Redish, supra note 1, at 68.
32. See Post, Democracy and Equality, supra note 25, at 26.
33. See id. at 27.
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My own understanding of the constitutional status of
commercial speech flows from this analysis. I have explained my
views at length elsewhere,34 and I will not repeat those views here.
Suffice it to say that I regard communications that seek to sell
toothpaste as different from communications that seek to influence
the formation of democratic public opinion. I therefore regard
commercial speech as distinct from public discourse, and I conclude
that it should not receive the constitutional protections that accrue to
public discourse.
Commercial speech does, however, circulate information to the
public sphere within which democratic public opinion is formed, and
this information might well be relevant to the formation of public
opinion. Thus, "[t]he First Amendment's concern for commercial
speech is based on the informational function of advertising. 35
Commercial speech is protected so that citizens can receive
information; it is not protected to insure that commercial speakers
retain the autonomy to express themselves as they choose. This
explains why commercial speech is routinely and constitutionally
regulated to compel the disclosure of accurate information.
Mandated disclosures of this kind would be anathema within the
domain of public discourse, where the autonomy of a speaker to
communicate or not to communicate is strictly protected.
Were Redish's conclusions accepted, the entire contemporary
regulatory regime for advertising, which seeks to protect consumers
by imposing content-based restrictions that prohibit "misleading"
advertising, would be undermined. So also would be the vast
regulatory apparatus that presently seeks to promote transparent and
efficient markets through labeling requirements and other forms of
mandated disclosures. Of course this is not a conclusive argument
against Redish's position, but it does strongly suggest that society as
a whole does not regard commercial speech as within the domain of
public discourse.
34. See Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. I
(2000); Robert Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets: Compelled Commercial Speech and
Coerced Commercial Association in United Foods, Zauderer, and Abood, 40 VAL. U. L. REV.
555 (2006).
35. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Servs. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980)
(citing First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)).
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I should note that the argument I am advancing about the
constitutional status of commercial speech is not what Redish calls
"ideological. 36  It is not hostile to commercial speech. The
argument is also not what he calls "intuitionist. '3 7 The argument I
am advancing seeks to apply a principled understanding of the
purposes of the First Amendment. It is true that the argument does
require a decision maker to make value judgments about which
speech acts form part of public discourse and which do not. This is
because the boundaries of public discourse must always and
inevitably be set by normative criteria.38 Such value judgments
commonly occur in First Amendment analysis, as for example when
courts determine whether or not communication is a "matter of
public concern."3 9 I do not think that Redish means to be so extreme
as to imply that all legal value judgments are "intuitionist," for he
himself asserts that First Amendment principles are to be determined
by reference to the values that the First Amendment seeks to protect.
The position I am advancing is therefore what Redish would call
"rationalist." 0
I rest my argument on a claim about the purposes of the First
Amendment and on a claim about the precise ways in which speech
serves to advance these purposes. The argument seeks to explain
why the Court has concluded "that 'commercial speech [enjoys] a
limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate
position in the scale of First Amendment values,' and is subject to
'modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of
noncommercial expression. 541
Redish will no doubt disagree both with my explanation of the
meaning of democracy and with my explanation of the ways in
36. See Redish, supra note 1, at 106.
37. See id. at 96.
38. See Robert Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion,
Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REv. 601, 667-84
(1990).
39. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 789 (1985)
(discussing First Amendment protection in the context of credit reporting); Connick v. Myers,
461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983) (discussing First Amendment protection afforded public employees'
communications); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 362 (1974) (discussing First
Amendment protection afforded defamatory comments directed toward public persons).
40. See Redish, supra note 1, at 80.
41. Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)).
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which freedom of speech is necessary for democracy. From
Redish's perspective, the account of commercial speech I advocate is
underinclusive, for it would not protect commercial speech as if it
were public discourse. Redish invokes the specter of viewpoint
discrimination because of this underinclusiveness. But in truth the
charge of underinclusiveness in this context signifies nothing more
than that Redish and I disagree about what constitutional democracy
is and how it must be served by freedom of speech. Such
disagreements are the meat of academic discussion. It simply
confuses such discussion to appeal to opprobrious and confused
labels like viewpoint discrimination.
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